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Preferences, Knowledge, and Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of 
Nuclear Power 
 
Abstract 
How does the American public assess risk when it comes to national security issues? This paper 
addresses this question by analyzing variation in citizen probability assessments of the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants. Drawing on the literature on how motivated reasoning, selective 
information processing, and domain specific knowledge influence public opinion, we argue that 
heterogeneous issue preferences and knowledge of nuclear energy and homeland security have 
important explanatory power. Using original data from a unique 2009 national survey in the 
United States, we show that Americans are divided in their probability assessments of the 
terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, individuals 
who support using nuclear power to meet rising energy demands, who are generally less 
concerned with terrorism, or who are more knowledgeable about terrorism and nuclear security 
tend to provide lower assessments of the likelihood that nuclear power plants increase terrorist 
attacks, and vice versa. The findings have implications for the literature on public opinion, risk 
assessment, energy policy and planning, and homeland security.  
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Preferences, Knowledge, and Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of 
Nuclear Power 
I. Introduction 
Policymakers and academics alike largely agree that nuclear and radiological (NR) terrorism 
now represents a significant threat to U.S. national security. In April 2010, President Barack 
Obama said that ―the single biggest threat to U.S. security – both short-term, medium-term and 
long-term – would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon‖ 
(Reuters, 2010). This view was shared by his predecessor, George W. Bush, who frequently 
referred to the dangers at the intersection of radicalism and technology. Meanwhile, dozens of 
countries, including the United States, are considering pursuing nuclear energy more 
aggressively as part of a movement that some have called the ―nuclear energy renaissance‖ (e.g., 
Fuhrmann, 2009, 2012a; Miller & Sagan, 2009). Nuclear power is growing in popularity, in part, 
because it has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help meet growing energy 
demands. Unfortunately, there may be a relationship, either real or perceived, between the 
diffusion of civilian nuclear programs and NR terrorism. Indeed, some have argued that nuclear 
reactors could be a source of nuclear materials for ―dirty bombs‖ or improvised nuclear devices. 
Nuclear power plants could also turn into targets of opportunity for terrorists. For example, al 
Qaeda reportedly planned to strike American nuclear facilities with airplanes as part of the 9/11 
attacks (Holt & Andrews, 2010).  
Yet we know quite little about how the American people assess the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks related to nuclear power plants. Answering this question has important implications for 
energy and homeland security policies. To the extent that politicians respond to the preferences 
of the electorate, the public’s probability assessment of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants 
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could influence the direction of nuclear energy policy in the United States and other democracies 
(see, e.g., Kitschelt, 1986). Understanding this issue is also important for garnering public 
support for future homeland security policy and expenditures. If citizens perceive a high risk for 
terrorism involving nuclear energy, policymakers may have to raise security standards for 
protecting nuclear power plants and allocate even more resources towards that end. Our 
understanding of counter-terrorism policies can also be enhanced by examining the factors that 
make citizens feel more or less vulnerable to this threat. Finally, this research also helps us better 
understand the formation of public opinion in an important issue area and contributes to the 
discussion of risk assessment of new technologies (e.g., Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; Gardner, 
2008; Legge & Durant, 2010). 
 To explain variations in citizen probability assessments of the terrorism risk associated 
with nuclear power plants, we draw on the literature on how motivated reasoning, selective 
information processing, and issue knowledge influence public opinion. We argue that pre-
existing attitudes toward, and knowledge of, nuclear energy and homeland security have 
important explanatory power. Citizens who support nuclear power because of future energy 
needs may assign a lower probability that nuclear power plants could contribute to terrorism. 
Individuals who worry more about terrorism may be more likely to offer a higher probability 
estimate. Those who have little specific knowledge about terrorism and nuclear security may be 
more likely to assess a higher probability for the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants, 
especially within the context of heightened anxiety since 9/11. Using original data from a unique 
national survey of a random digit sample of all telephone households in the United States 
conducted in 2009, we show that the American public is divided in its probability assessments of 
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the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. Further statistical analysis produces supporting 
evidence for our theoretical expectations.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present the new survey 
evidence on the link between nuclear energy and terrorism. In the next section we offer some 
theoretical explanations for the divided probability assessments. In Sections IV-VI, we discuss 
our research design, present our findings, and carry out additional robustness checks. We 
conclude the paper by summarizing the findings, discussing their implications for theory and 
policy, and identifying various limitations and possible future research efforts. 
 
II. Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy 
How do the American people assess the terrorism risk in the use of nuclear energy? In a 
national telephone survey developed by researchers at the Institute for Science, Technology and 
Public Policy (ISTPP) at Texas A&M University, funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and conducted by the Public Policy Research Institute (a Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing unit at Texas A&M University) in August 2009, a total of 924 
individuals from a random national sample of adults 18 years and older completed interviews. 
The survey employed a random digit sample of all telephone households in the United States.
1
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 The survey was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008-DN-
077-ARI018-03. The dates of the survey were August 6, 2009 – September 21, 2009.  Following the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) conventions and algorithms, the survey's computed completion 
rate was 78.4%, the cooperation rate was 16.8%, and the response rate was 5.4%. We do not believe the absence of 
cell telephone numbers in the sample has negatively affected the representativeness of the overall sample, even for 
younger respondents who tend to be more personally cell phone exclusive than older adults. In their recent 
comprehensive study comparing 81 national surveys with response rates varying from 5% to 54%, Holbrook, 
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Each interview session was conducted in English and averaged 35 minutes in duration. Each 
respondent was asked whether he or she strongly agrees, agrees, disagrees, or strongly disagrees 
that ―using nuclear power plants increases the possibility of a terrorist attack involving nuclear 
weapons or nuclear materials.‖ 
Risk as a measurable concept in many disciplines (psychology, statistical decision theory, 
business, public health and safety, etc.) is often defined as the product between the probability of 
an adverse event and the severity of injury or quantified loss from the event (see, e.g., Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1984; Hubbard, 2009). Since the severity of injury or 
quantified loss from a terrorist attack is often more likely to be subjective and inflated (see, e.g., 
Gardner, 2008), we choose to analyze the relatively objective probability component of the 
terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. 
The survey NR question intends to capture two types of terrorist attacks associated with 
nuclear power plants. In the first type, nuclear power plants become a source of nuclear materials 
that terrorists could acquire to produce crude nuclear weapons or dirty bombs to attack any target 
(which may or may not include nuclear power plants). In the second type, nuclear power plants 
are targets of terrorist attacks, causing radioactive fallout, radiation exposure, and other 
radiological, environmental, and health consequences. Our survey question does not distinguish 
between the two types of attacks, but this is not problematic for the purposes of our analysis. 
This is because we are interested in citizens’ highest perceived risk among the different threats, 
and respondents are likely to report their answers based on the risks which they believe are most 
                                                                                                                                                             
Krosnick and Pfent (2007) found that RDD telephone surveys with low response rates ―do not notably reduce the 
quality of survey demographic estimates‖ (p. 527). See also Lavrakas, Shuttles, Steeh, and Fienberg (2007) for 
significant problems and difficulties in cell phone interviewing. 
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probable. Moreover, both types of threats are associated with the broad notion of nuclear and 
radiological terrorism.
2
 Many nuclear security experts take both types of threats seriously (e.g., 
Allison, 2004; Bunn & Braun, 2003; Ferguson & Potter, 2004; Hirsch, 2002). Real world events 
also suggest that nuclear power plants could be exposed to these terrorism risks.
3
 Terrorist 
attacks involving nuclear power plants or materials obtained from them have also received 
attention from the media and in a number of pop culture depictions (e.g., the 2010 film, Edge of 
Darkness; the 2005 film, Last Best Chance, and the television series, 24). Hence, we believe 
broad public awareness exists concerning both types of threats. The question allows us to 
examine how citizens in the United States gauge the likelihood of nuclear power plants leading 
to these terrorist attacks involving nuclear weapons or materials.  
 Figure 1 presents the distribution of responses to the survey NR question, based on 
whether the respondents agree, strongly agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. Overall, among the 
861 respondents who replied to the question (the other 63 respondents did not answer this 
question), about 43% agree or strongly agree that using nuclear power plants increases the 
possibility of terrorist attacks involving nuclear weapons or materials, whereas about 57% 
disagree or strongly disagree. The pattern of responses in Figure 1 indicates that the American 
people are divided in their probability assessments of terrorism risk associated with nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 As a caveat, we do not distinguish nuclear and radiological terrorism in this analysis because separating the two 
requires technical knowledge many respondents simply do not possess. 
3
 See Ferguson and Potter (2004) for a discussion of the relevant historical cases. 
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energy. This finding does not differ dramatically from the results of other similar survey 
questions, and indicates a lack of consensus on the question and the perceived risk.
4
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
III. Explaining Divided Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy 
Why do the American people have different probability assessments over the terrorism 
risk of nuclear energy? We argue that the answer lies in people’s heterogeneous preferences and 
knowledge levels regarding nuclear energy and nuclear security. 
 
Effects of Issue Preference Heterogeneity 
Individuals have different prior dispositions, beliefs, and preferences regarding nuclear 
energy and terrorism (e.g., Kuklinski, Metlay, & Kay, 1982). Assuming the same level of issue-
specific knowledge, when individuals are compelled to identify the link between these two 
phenomena, their prior beliefs and preferences often influence how they process information and 
draw inferences. As the risks of nuclear and radiological terrorism tend to be nuanced and 
complex (e.g., Allison, 2004; Bunn & Braun, 2003; Bunn & Wier, 2006), ―hard‖ domain-specific 
information is likely scarce and costly for citizens to acquire (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002, p. 40). 
Thus citizens’ predispositions on the two issues should affect their motivation to acquire specific 
information and how they incorporate it within the context of their established beliefs. This 
suggests that those who favor nuclear energy are more likely to downplay the risk of nuclear 
power plants, whereas those who oppose nuclear energy are more likely to emphasize the risk. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4
 For example, Harris Interactive conducted a survey in 2007 that included the question: ―How would you rate the 
likelihood of each of the following happening as a terrorist attack in the United States? An attack on a nuclear power 
station.‖ 62% of respondents said such an attack was likely, while only 32% said it was not likely.  
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At the same time, those who are relatively more concerned about personal security from 
terrorism will be more sensitive to the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants, whereas those who 
are relatively less concerned about terrorism will be less sensitive to any risks. 
 This explanation draws on the large body of literature on how motivated reasoning and 
selective information processing influence the formation of public opinion. In that literature, an 
important premise is that all reasoning is motivated (Druckman and Bolsen, 2011; Kunda, 1990; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006) and, consequently, people aim for preferred outcomes, irrespective of 
whether or not they are correct (Lebo & Cassino, 2007).
5
 Arguably, ―tension between drives for 
accuracy and belief perseverance underlies all human reasoning‖ (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 756; 
see also Jacobson, 2010). This notion underscores the role selective information processing plays 
in the formation of individual attitudes and risk assessments. 
Along this line of reasoning, several psychological mechanisms can come into play in the 
formation of individual attitudes on a topic. First, individuals often seek out information that 
supports their existing beliefs (Lodge, Taber & Galonsky, 1999; Schultz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens 
& Moscovici, 2000), a characteristic labeled as the "confirmation bias" (Gardner, 2009). For 
example, Sweeney and Gruber (1984) find that in elections, people look for negative information 
about candidates that are from a political party different from their own. Second, individuals 
might convince themselves that information contradicting their existing beliefs is actually 
supportive (Bartels, 2000), or they often discount dissonant information from less trusted sources 
(Festinger, 1957; Petty & Wegener, 1998). Third, people often have selective memory 
                                                                                                                                                             
5
In accepting this premise, we depart from traditional Bayesian explanations of opinion formation, which suggest 
that individuals rationally evaluate information and update their beliefs on the basis of new information (Gerber & 
Green, 1999).   
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(Jacobson, 2010). That is, individuals often remember information that reinforces their existing 
beliefs but tend to forget events that contradict them. Fourth, some scholars argue that motivated 
skepticism or selective judgment explains why biases influence public opinion. When faced with 
information that contradicts their beliefs, individuals work hard to develop counterarguments or 
discredit the source (Lodge & Taber, 2000; Rucker & Petty, 2004). On the other hand, citizens 
often accept information that supports their predispositions without reservation. For example, 
during the Monica Lewinsky scandal Republicans were more likely to accept negative reports 
about President Clinton at face value (Fischle, 2000). None of these mechanisms and arguments 
implies that citizens intentionally deceive themselves. Individuals often believe that they are 
approaching a given question objectively, but they are unaware that their preconceived notions 
and preferences make it difficult for them to be fair-minded (Lodge & Taber, 2005, 2006). 
The theory of motivated political reasoning informs us about how citizens will assess the 
risks of nuclear energy, including terrorism. Both the Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl 
accidents illustrate that motivated reasoning played a role in how nuclear accidents affect public 
perceptions of nuclear safety. The partial nuclear reactor meltdown that took place in 1979 at the 
TMI nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania had a dramatic effect on public attitudes 
towards the safety of nuclear energy. In evaluating the American public’s comparative 
perceptions of the risks in various activities and technologies, Slovic (1987) found that nuclear 
power topped the list of the public’s fears. Yet, the public’s incident-induced fears stood in stark 
contrast to the views held within the scientific community regarding the safety of nuclear energy 
(Lichter & Rothman, 1983; Rothman & Lichter, 1987; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1980). Research conducted on American opinions of the effects of the disastrous 
accident at the Soviet nuclear facility at Chernobyl in 1986 revealed that, while the incident had 
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a severe negative effect on public opinion for citizens who had indifferent beliefs about nuclear 
power prior to the accident, it had less of an impact for people who supported nuclear energy 
prior to the incident (Renn, 1990). This suggests that, compared to citizens who oppose nuclear 
power or do not have strong prior beliefs one way or the other, individuals who support the use 
of nuclear energy are likely to be more dismissive of its problems, exhibiting motivated 
skepticism (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
As another example, the World Nuclear Association, which supports the global nuclear 
industry, formed a rival interpretation of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents rather than changing 
its prior beliefs. The Association suggested that the relative rarity of disasters over a period of 
several decades actually was indicative of nuclear power’s safety, especially when compared to 
other technologies (World Nuclear Association, 2010). 
Comparable dynamics are likely to be present when it comes to assessing the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants. We expect that people’s pre-existing preferences about nuclear 
energy will influence their assessments of the connection between nuclear power and terrorism. 
Individuals who have favorable priors regarding nuclear energy will tend to see less of its 
dangers of terrorism. Moreover, they are less likely to scrutinize statements by politicians and 
alarmists that emphasize the risks of nuclear terrorism. In contrast, those who oppose nuclear 
power are more likely to emphasize the terrorism risk of nuclear energy. These individuals are 
more likely to seek out and remember information indicating that such a possibility exists. 
Similarly, preferences about homeland security should also affect citizens’ probability 
assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power. We expect that the extent to which people 
worry about terrorism influences their evaluations. Scholars have found that fear and anxiety 
shape how individuals form opinions (e.g., Gardner, 2009; Marcus, 1988). As Lebo and Cassino 
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(2007) note, ―anxiety leads individuals to pay more attention to the political landscape and to 
contemporary political information‖ (p.726). Thus people who worry about issues such as 
terrorism and nuclear security may be more aware of relevant expert opinions and public 
statements by policymakers. As noted above, the media often point to the terrorism potential 
associated with nuclear facilities and materials and, in a general sense, the post 9/11 trend is to 
be "terrified of terrorism" (Gardner, 2009). Thus citizens who are already concerned about 
terrorism are likely to listen more closely and are more likely to believe that using nuclear power 
increases the possibility of terrorist attacks. On the other hand, those who are less concerned 
about terrorism will tend to pay less attention to related statements in the media by policymakers 
and scholars. Even when they do listen, they may be more dismissive of information suggesting 
that a terrorist attack of any kind is likely, given that their existing beliefs suggest otherwise. 
This discussion leads to two testable hypotheses on citizens’ perceptions of the terrorism risks 
stemming from nuclear power: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who support the use of nuclear power are less likely to agree that using 
nuclear power increases the probability of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and vice versa. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are more concerned about homeland security and terrorism are 
more likely to agree that using nuclear power increases the probability of nuclear and 
radiological terrorism, and vice versa. 
 
Effect of Issue Knowledge 
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The likelihood that terrorists could acquire materials from nuclear power plants to 
construct crude nuclear weapons or dirty bombs for attacks is low (Bunn & Wier, 2006; 
Ferguson & Potter, 2004), but terrorists contemplating nuclear attacks may believe otherwise. In 
addition, a terrorist attack severe enough to lead to the release of nuclear materials from a 
nuclear power plant (e.g., a breach of a spent nuclear fuel pool) is also a low probability event, 
but the consequences are potentially severe (Hirsch, 2002).
6
  
One obstacle for extremist groups interested in nuclear and radiological terrorism is 
obtaining access to weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Allison, 2004; 
Bunn, 2007; Cirincione, 2007; Holgate, 2005). Civilian nuclear programs could raise the risk of 
nuclear terrorism if they increase the availability of these fissile materials for terrorists (see 
Early, Fuhrmann, and Li, 2011). However, it is worth noting that most modern nuclear power 
reactors do not rely on HEU for fuel, instead using low enriched uranium (LEU) that might be 
used to produce dirty bombs but could not be used directly to build nuclear weapons.
7
 Civilian 
power plants produce plutonium when fuel rods are burned in a reactor, but it would be difficult 
for terrorists to obtain and extract this material. Meanwhile, since 9/11, nuclear power plants 
have received increased protection, making them much more difficult for terrorists to attack.  
The complex nature of nuclear technology implies that accurate assessments of its risks 
depend on the extent of citizens’ domain-specific information regarding nuclear technology and 
                                                                                                                                                             
6
 The March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant illustrates this point. An earthquake 
and tsunami caused nuclear fuel rods at the facility to meltdown, leading to the release of radioactive materials, 
widespread environmental contamination, and panic among the local population. 
7
 LEU could only be used to build nuclear weapons through a complicated process known as enrichment, which 
increases the percentage of U-235. Uranium generally needs to include 90% U-235 in order to be useful for nuclear 
weapons. Uranium fuel rods used in power plants typically include less than 5% U-235. 
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homeland security. For a number of reasons we expect that many individuals do not possess the 
requisite knowledge to assess those risks accurately, leading them to assign high probabilities to 
the terrorism risks posed by nuclear power plants. As noted, this is particularly likely given the 
salience of the terrorism issue since 9/11 (e.g., Gardner, 2008).  
First, relevant information on the nuanced nature of the threat posed by nuclear and 
radiological terrorism is complex, scarce, and costly for citizens to acquire (e.g., Allison, 2004; 
Bunn & Braun, 2003; Bunn & Wier, 2006). As Alvarez and Brehm (2002) point out regarding 
public opinion and public policy in general, ―hard information about policy issues is likely to be 
less widely held by the public, since it is the sort of information that would be known by only 
those who are well informed about politics in general or who are knowledgeable about the policy 
in question‖ (p. 40). The highly technical nature of nuclear technology, in general, makes hard 
information on the specific security policies required to protect against NR terrorism threats 
especially difficult to acquire for the general public. 
Second, a number of past studies have questioned the American public’s ability to 
accurately assess the safety risks posed by nuclear energy (e.g., Darmofal, 2005; Inglehart, 1984; 
Rothman & Lichter, 1987; Slovic et al., 1980), the logic of which also applies to the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants. As noted earlier, past findings regarding nuclear safety revealed a 
significant divergence between public attitudes and the views held by the scientific community. 
A survey of American elites (i.e., scientists, lawyers, bureaucrats, media pundits, etc.) conducted 
by Rothman and Lichter (1987) showed that 76% of the energy experts and almost 99% of the 
nuclear energy experts from the scientific community sampled agreed that nuclear energy was 
safe (p. 386). Despite this fairly broad consensus of the scientific community on the issue, the 
American public continued to view the risks of nuclear energy ―as far more dangerous than any 
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realistic assessment would indicate‖ (Rothman & Lichter, 1987, p. 387). Many scholars have 
also argued that the general public’s perceptions of the safety risks in nuclear energy are 
irrational and uninformed (e.g., Cohen, 1983). Inglehart (1984) found that roughly six out of 
seven Americans thought that it is possible for nuclear power plants to produce atomic bomb-
style explosions—a physical impossibility. If individuals often fundamentally misunderstand the 
nuclear-energy technologies in a way that overinflates the threat they pose, they also are likely to 
assign a higher probability to the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants.  
The degree of a high probability risk assessment, however, varies among individuals 
depending on their issue-specific knowledge. Kuklinski et al. (1982) found that more 
knowledgeable individuals tended to make better calculated choices in weighing the costs and 
benefits of nuclear energy in determining their level of support for it (p. 621-622).  
The logic articulated above suggests that the lack of accurate information regarding 
nuclear technology and terrorism leads some individuals to conclude greater terrorism risks than 
their more informed fellow citizens. It would not be surprising, then, to find that variations in 
individuals’ levels of hard knowledge regarding nuclear and terrorism issues helps to explain 
divergent probability assessments of the terrorism risk posed by nuclear power plants. Citizens 
who lack the domain-specific knowledge necessary to understand the complex and low-
probability nature of the event are more likely to rely on cues from pop culture and the media, 
which tend to overinflate the risk (e.g., Gardner, 2008).
8
 A third hypothesis relating to the 
importance of knowledge in evaluating risk emerges from this discussion: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
8
 The effect of the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan has yet to be determined and may affect this calculation in 
the future. This study was conducted before that tragic event. 
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Hypothesis 3: Relative to those with more issue-specific knowledge, individuals with less 
knowledge about nuclear and homeland security are likely to assign a higher probability to the 
terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. 
 
IV. Research Design 
 To test these expectations, we estimate the following model using our 2009 national 
survey data: 
Pr(Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy) = β0 +β1 Support Nuclear Energy + β2 Terrorism 
Concern + β3Terrorism/Nuclear Knowledge + β4Education + β5Plant Proximity + 
β6Evangelical + β7Independent + β8Democrat + β9Ideology + β10Age + β11Male +  
β12Income + ε, where ε is the error term. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the variable we are interested in explaining has four categories. 
Since our primary interest is to analyze the public divide in their assessments of the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants, we dichotomize the variable into two categories to sharpen our 
analysis.
9
 Hence, the dependent variable, Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy, is coded 1 if a 
respondent agrees or strongly agrees that operating nuclear power plants increases the risk of 
terrorist attacks involving nuclear weapons or materials and 0 if a respondent disagrees or 
strongly disagrees.  
To test Hypothesis 1, we construct a key independent variable, Support Nuclear Energy, 
to capture an individual’s preference for using nuclear energy to meet rising energy demands. 
The variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if a respondent agrees or strongly agrees that ―the U.S. 
should construct new nuclear power plants to meet its future energy needs,‖ and 0 otherwise. If 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 For robustness check, we also estimate the primary model using the four-category dependent variable and ordered 
probit. The results for the key variables remain significant and in the expected directions. 
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our expectation is correct, β1 should be negative, indicating that those who prefer using nuclear 
energy to satisfy the energy needs are more likely to assign a lower probability to the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants.  
 We employ an ordinal variable from the survey to capture a respondent’s preference for 
personal security from terrorism to test Hypothesis 2. Terrorism Concern is a respondent’s rating 
of how worried or concerned he or she is about terrorism and homeland security. It ranges from 0 
to 10, with higher values indicating greater concerns. We expect β2 to be positive. That is, the 
stronger one’s concern over terrorism and nuclear materials, the more likely a respondent is to 
think that nuclear power plants increase the risk of terrorism. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we code Terrorism/Nuclear (T/N) Knowledge as a ―hard 
information‖ measure of a respondent’s knowledge about terrorism and nuclear security. It 
ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating more knowledge regarding terrorism and 
nuclear security. The variable is based on five true-false questions regarding (1) the first atomic 
bombs used, (2) which country has the most nuclear weapons, (3) whether terrorists have ever 
stolen a nuclear weapon, (4) whether air cargo shipped on U.S. passenger aircrafts are inspected 
prior to its loading, and (5) whether the ban of liquids over 3.4 ounces on passenger airplanes is 
based on scientific studies.
10
 Individuals with more substantive knowledge should be more 
capable of relatively accurately assessing the risk of terrorism and may be more informed about 
the risks identified by the nuclear security community. As a caveat, the variable is a proxy for 
knowledge of terrorism and nuclear security rather than a perfect measure. To the extent that the 
measure is valid and Hypothesis 3 is correct, β4 should be negative. That is, individuals with less 
                                                                                                                                                             
10
 The distribution of the number of the correct answers among the survey respondents is as follows: 0 (19), 1 (86), 2 
(245), 3 (376), 4 (170), and 5 (28).   
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knowledge are likely to report a greater likelihood for terrorism attacks involving nuclear power 
plants. 
 In addition to heterogeneous preferences and knowledge about nuclear energy and 
terrorism, individuals may also vary in terms of income, age, gender, religious belief, educational 
background, ideology, partisanship, and residential location. To ensure that our empirical tests of 
the three hypotheses are not confounded by these other factors, we control for them in our model. 
The variable Education, which is on a 6-point scale measuring a respondent’s educational level 
(lowest level=1; highest level=6), also helps capture the respondent’s ability to assess the 
terrorism risk of nuclear energy accurately. The variable Plant Proximity is a dummy variable, 
coded 1 for those who reported that they live within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant, and 0 
otherwise. This variable allows us to assess whether living near a nuclear power plant affects 
individuals’ views concerning the terrorism risks of the plant.  
Evangelical is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent is an Evangelical 
Christian or not, which helps to control for the impact of religion. Self-identification as an 
Evangelical Christian is becoming an important organizer of individual political attitudes, 
behavior and policy choices in the U.S. Recent research has identified Evangelical status as 
being strongly related to attitudes and policy choices about family decline issues (Brooks, 2002), 
abortion (Bolzendahl & Brooks, 2005), divorce (Stokes & Ellison, 2010), same-sex marriage 
(Campbell & Monson, 2008; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de Vries, 2011) and 
evolution (Berkman & Plutzer, 2009; Freeman & Houston, 2009). In addition to these social 
issues, Evangelical identifications have been shown to be strongly related to national security 
issues like support for a hawkish policy in the Middle East and the Iraq War (Baumgartner, 
Francia, & Morris, 2008; Froese & Mencken, 2009). As another national security issue, it is 
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possible that Evangelical status may be conditioning nuclear terror orientations and we, 
therefore, include it in the present analysis. 
 Independent and Democrat are two dummy variables for partisanship, indicating whether 
a respondent is an Independent or a Democrat, with the base category indicating Republican. 
Given the past affiliation of the anti-nuclear movement with the Democratic Party, Democrats 
may be more motivated to seek out negative information on the security risks of nuclear energy 
than Republicans (Joppke, 1993, p. 138-140). Ideology is a variable on a 7-point scale measuring 
a respondent’s ideological orientation, with higher values indicating more conservativeness. 
Income is a measure of wealth based on an 11-point scale, with levels ranging from less than 
$10,000 to more than $100,000. Age and Male indicate the respondent’s age and gender, 
respectively. 
In survey research, framing often plays an important role in biasing the responses. This is 
particularly important for the validity of our analysis since a respondent, if asked first about the 
terrorism risk of nuclear power plants, may then answer the other questions about their 
preferences over nuclear energy and nuclear security based on their responses to the first 
question. To minimize the possibility of such an endogeneity bias, the survey asks the respondent 
to answer first the questions regarding their preferences over nuclear energy and homeland 
security and then the question regarding the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use the probit estimator, with robust 
standard errors to deal with possible heteroskedastic error variance. Summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1. The correlation matrix of all the variables is presented in Appendix 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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V. Findings  
Table 2 reports the results from six statistical models. Column 1 is the baseline model 
upon which we focus our discussion, which includes all variables except for income. We exclude 
this variable in the baseline test because a large number of respondents are not willing to report 
information pertaining to their income. Column 2 includes the income variable. Columns 3-6 
report the results from a series of robustness tests, which we discuss in the next section. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 We start with the findings displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Support Nuclear 
Energy has a statistically significant negative effect in columns 1 and 2. Individuals who prefer 
the development of new nuclear power plants for the sake of meeting rising energy demands tend 
to report that nuclear power plants do not increase the risk of terrorist attacks. When the dummy 
variable goes from zero to one, the predicted probability that an individual reports that nuclear 
power plants increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks drops by about 0.26 in the baseline 
model. To gauge whether these effects are large in size or not, we compare them to the sample 
average of the dependent variable, which is about 0.42. Substantively, respondents who support 
the use of nuclear power to meet rising energy needs are 62% less likely to agree that nuclear 
power plants increase the possibility of terrorist attacks involving nuclear weapons or nuclear 
materials. Hence, an individual’s preference for nuclear energy is a powerful predictor of his or 
her assessment of the effect of nuclear power plants on the terrorism risk. Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed. 
 Terrorism Concern has a statistically significant positive effect in columns 1 and 2, as 
predicted. Individuals who are more concerned about personal security from terrorism are more 
likely to see nuclear power plants as increasing the probability of terrorist attacks. Since the 
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terrorism concern variable ranges from 0 to 10, we compute its substantive effect on the 
predicted probability of the dependent variable when it increases by one unit, by one standard 
deviation (from 0.5 standard deviation below the mean to 0.5 standard deviation above), and by 
ten units (from minimum to maximum) using the baseline model. The predicted probability that 
an individual reports that nuclear power plants increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks rises by 
about 0.02, 0.06, and 0.22, respectively, amounting to about 5%, 14%, and 52% increases over 
the sample average (0.42) of the dependent variable. The larger the gap between two individuals 
in their concerns over homeland security, the more likely their views are to diverge on whether 
nuclear power plants increase terrorist risks involving the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
materials. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. 
 Lastly, T/N Knowledge demonstrates the statistically significant negative effect that we 
expected in columns 1 and 2. Individuals with less hard information about homeland security and 
nuclear security are more likely to assess nuclear power plants as increasing the probability of 
terrorist attacks. This result is consistent with our theoretical expectation and other findings in 
the literature regarding the effect of knowledge on individual assessments of nuclear safety. 
When T/N Knowledge rises from its minimum (0) to maximum (5) values, the predicted 
probability that an individual reports that nuclear power plants increase the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks declines by 0.21. Put differently, all else being equal, a respondent who answered all of 
our test questions correctly was 50% less likely to view nuclear power plants as increasing 
terrorist risks than a respondent who answered none of the questions correctly. Domain-specific 
knowledge thus has a salient impact upon how individuals perceive the terrorism risks associated 
with nuclear power. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. 
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Two important points regarding the three key independent variables are worth noting. 
First, the effects of individual issue preferences and knowledge are statistically and substantively 
significant when they are included simultaneously in the same model. These results demonstrate 
that when individuals assess the probability component of the terrorism risk of nuclear power 
plants, both issue preferences and knowledge levels exert significant, independent influences.
11
 
As discussed later in the conclusion section, the finding contributes to the literature on how 
individuals assess the risks associated with new technologies. Second, the effects of individual 
issue preferences and knowledge are both statistically and substantively important even when we 
control for individual differences in other personal attributes.  
In terms of the control variables, as shown in column 2, people with higher incomes are 
less likely to assess nuclear power plants as raising the likelihood of terrorist attacks. 
Respondents with higher educational levels are less likely to see the construction of nuclear 
power plants as increasing the risk of terrorist attacks, although the statistically significant effect 
in column 1 turns insignificant in column 2 when we account for the confounding effect of 
income.
12
  
Relative to the Republicans, the Democrat respondents tend to assign a higher terrorism 
risk to nuclear power plants. This statistically significant difference in column 1 washes out, 
though, when income is included in column 2. In contrast, an Independent respondent is 
statistically indistinguishable from a Republican respondent in both columns 1 and 2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
11
 When the three variables enter the models sequentially, they remain statistically significant in the expected 
directions in the respective models. These results are not reported for the sake of space. 
12
 This is not surprising given the strong correlation between income and education, which is 0.39—the third highest 
correlation as shown in Appendix 1. 
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Finally, as shown in columns 1 and 2, respondents do not exhibit statistically significant gender, 
age, religious faith, or ideological differences over their assessments of the terrorism risk of 
nuclear power plants. Interestingly, people who report living close to nuclear power plants do not 
report higher nuclear and radiological terrorism risks, compared to those who do not live near 
such a facility. This finding could emerge because of a possible selection effect (see, e.g., 
Tiebout, 1956).
13
 
 
VI. Robustness Tests 
We conducted three important robustness checks of our initial findings reported in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. First, one may be concerned that, contrary to our expectation, one's 
probability assessment of the terrorism risk of nuclear power causes his or her preferences for 
nuclear energy. This possibility renders the Support Nuclear Energy variable endogenous to the 
dependent variable. The best econometric strategy to address this possibility is to find a valid 
instrument that is theoretically related to Support Nuclear Energy but unrelated to Terrorism 
Risk of Nuclear Energy.  
We use an individual’s reported attention to the environment issue in the news as a direct 
instrument for the variable Support Nuclear Energy for the following reasons. Given the public’s 
past opposition to nuclear energy on the basis of the environmental hazards of nuclear accidents 
                                                                                                                                                             
13
 The 2008 MIT Energy Survey revealed that 76.5% of Americans would oppose the siting of new nuclear power 
plant within 25 miles of their homes—with 55.3% of them strongly opposing it (Ansolabehere & Konisky, 2009, p. 
570). People who perceive nuclear power plants as dangerous are unlikely to choose to live near them. On the other 
hand, individuals with low incomes may not have a choice regarding where they live. These citizens might be forced 
to live in close proximity to a nuclear power plant even if they believe that it is dangerous from the perspective of   
safety or security. This could explain why the net effect of plant proximity is statistically insignificant. 
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and nuclear waste, we would expect a negative relationship between the salience of individual 
attention to environmental issues and support for nuclear energy. Though scientific elites have 
increasingly embraced nuclear energy as a potential solution to environmental problems, such as 
global warming (e.g., Pralle and Boscarino, 2011), general public attitudes have tended to 
diverge from the vanguard scientific opinion on nuclear energy issues since the 1980s (e.g., 
Rothman & Lichter, 1987). At the same time, we have no theoretical reason to expect that an 
individual’s attention to environmental issues should be related to his/her perception of terrorism 
risk. This makes attention to the environment a theoretically valid instrument; it is negatively 
correlated with an individual’s support for nuclear energy but not closely related to the terrorism 
risk of nuclear energy. Hence, when we enter the instrumental variable in the model instead, we 
expect that it should positively affect Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy—given that it is 
negatively correlated with Support Nuclear Energy.  
The results for this test are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. As shown, the 
instrumental variable does exercise the statistically significant positive effect on the terrorism 
risk of nuclear energy that we expected. Hence, the results on Support Nuclear Energy in 
columns 1 and 2 are not an artifact of the possible endogeneity bias. 
The second robustness test examines whether the non-random missing values for the 
income variable bias our results. In the survey, the income variable produced the largest number 
of missing values, with 171 respondents refusing to report income and 57 respondents saying 
they do not know—a total of 228 respondents. Analysis suggests that these missing values are 
not random, with older people, women, and less educated respondents more likely to provide no 
information on income.  
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To examine whether the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are sensitive to the non-
random missing pattern in the income variable, we estimate a Heckman-like selection model 
(Heckman, 1979) to control for the non-random selection by individuals providing information 
on income. The main identification variables for the selection equation include a constructed 
continuous measure of how many questions an individual chooses to answer in the whole survey, 
capturing the general willingness of an individual to provide information, as well as age, gender, 
and education. Interestingly, the hypothesis that the cross-equation correlation (ρ) equals zero 
fails to be rejected as shown in columns 5 and 6; hence, the selection effect does not affect the 
estimates of those variables in columns 1and 2. Still, as reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, 
the effects of the three key independent variables of interest remain statistically significant and in 
the expected directions. 
Finally, in a third robustness test not reported here due to space constraint, we estimated 
column 1 in Table 2 for three separate groups: Democrat, Republican and Independent. This 
allows us to assess the possibility that an individual may adopt his/her party’s view such that 
he/she ignores his/her own issue-specific knowledge. It turns out that the knowledge variable 
remains statistically significant for Independents, but loses its significance in both the Democrat 
and Republican samples.
14
 So the effect of issue knowledge appears to be moderated by an 
individual's partisanship, but does not influence Independents. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 We also explored running a weighted survey analysis using a weight variable that adjusts for income, education 
level, race, and age based on U.S. census data. While the results from this analysis largely support our findings from 
above, the weights used are not completely accurate for our sample and hence, the results are not presented here.     
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In this article, we examine variations in citizen probability assessments of the terrorism 
risk of nuclear energy. Our analysis makes several important findings. First, using original 
survey data from a national random sample, we demonstrate that Americans are divided over 
their probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear power plants. While 43% of the 
respondents believe that nuclear power plants increase the possibility of a terrorist attack 
involving nuclear weapons or nuclear materials, 57% of the respondents do not. Second, we offer 
and test several theoretical explanations for the variations in respondents’ probability 
assessments of the terrorism risk posed by nuclear power plants. We demonstrate that 
heterogeneous public preferences and knowledge levels regarding nuclear energy and homeland 
security matter the most. Individuals who support using nuclear power to meet rising energy 
demands, who are generally less concerned with terrorism, or who are more knowledgeable 
about terrorism and nuclear security tend to provide lower assessments of the likelihood that 
nuclear power plants increase terrorist attacks. In contrast, those who are opposed to using 
nuclear power, are more concerned with homeland security, or are less knowledgeable about 
terrorism and nuclear security often provide higher assessments of the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks due to nuclear power plants. 
Our research has several important implications. First, contrary to the views of many 
pundits and experts, the American people appear split in their probability assessments of the 
terrorism risk of nuclear energy. When they design and seek support for their security policies, 
U.S. officials should be aware that more than half of the citizens polled in our survey disagree 
that nuclear power plants make terrorist attacks more likely. After the accidents at the Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl nuclear facilities, fear-invoked public opposition to nuclear power in the 
United States led to greater regulation of the nuclear energy industry, dramatically increased the 
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costs of constructing and operating nuclear power plants, and led a number of state governments 
to pass full moratoriums on their construction (Fuhrmann, 2012b). The March 2011 nuclear 
meltdown that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility in Japan appears to have 
generated similar responses. In comparing these safety concerns to citizens’ security concerns 
regarding nuclear power’s usage, we find that respondents’ probability assessments of the 
terrorism risk it poses do not suggest a wide demand for extensive, expensive security measures 
to protect nuclear power plants. This appears consistent with the controversial observation and 
criticism that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a record of imposing rather lax security 
standards for U.S. nuclear power plants (see Hirsch, 2002). 
Second, the finding that individuals with less domain-specific knowledge are more likely 
to have higher probability assessments of the terrorism risk of nuclear energy is consistent with 
the view that many Americans do not understand the intricacies of the threats posed by nuclear 
and radiological terrorism. It is not uncommon for citizens to conflate nuclear weapons with 
dirty bombs in the same way that many think that nuclear power plants can yield nuclear 
explosions. When citizens possess a greater scientific and technical understanding of nuclear 
technologies and homeland security policies, we expect that their assessments of the probable 
risk of nuclear power facilities contributing to terrorism would be more likely to reflect the true 
risk posed. To encourage the adoption of sound nuclear security policies, then, educating the 
public about nuclear energy and terrorism deserve an important place on the public policy 
agenda—especially following the tenth anniversary of 9/11. This is a difficult task, however, 
because of the technical complexity of nuclear technology and the difficulty of translating 
technical knowledge into accessible language for laypersons, but one nonetheless worthy of 
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pursuit. It may also pay positive dividends in helping the public respond appropriately to nuclear 
accidents, disasters, or terrorist attacks if they occur. 
Third, as we have shown, individual predispositions towards nuclear energy and 
homeland security significantly affect assessments of the likelihood of terrorist attacks associated 
with nuclear power plants. The strong substantive effects of individual predispositions suggest 
that citizens are more drawn to information that supports their existing views. The finding also 
shows that the reason why it may be difficult to obtain consensus agreements regarding the 
security risks of nuclear plants is due in large part to citizens’ heterogeneous preferences over 
substantive and competing issues (e.g., preference for low cost energy). Hence, identifying 
individual issue preferences is important in order to understand the formation of public opinion 
in general. 
Finally, our research contributes to the discussion of risk assessment of new technologies 
and related public policies, such as genetically modified foods and stem cell research (see, e.g., 
Critchley & Turney, 2004; Druckman & Bolsen 2011; Kearns, Grove-White, Macnaghten, 
Wilsdon, & Wynne, 2006; Legge and Durant, 2010; Nisbet, 2005). The issue is whether risk 
assessment for new technologies and their regulation should be driven primarily by scientific 
knowledge and related cost-benefit analysis alone; or should it also consider other sociocultural, 
political, ideological, and demographic factors, as well as the relevance of involuntariness and 
high uncertainty of risk? Recent studies (e.g., Legge & Durant, 2010; Nisbet, 2005) tend to find 
that information and knowledge matter, but so do many other forces, including individual issue 
preferences, religious and ideological value predispositions, and trust in experts and government 
regulators. By focusing on the probability aspect of risk assessment, our research speaks directly 
to this literature. As probability assessment often relies more on scientific knowledge and 
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methods, we should expect individual issue preferences and tradeoffs to play a smaller role. Our 
findings, however, indicate that even for probability assessment, individual issue preferences 
have a much larger impact than issue knowledge. Hence, risk assessment is rarely a neutral and 
objective exercise.  
Our research has its own limitations and thus, future research may expand it in several 
directions. First, to sharpen our analysis, we focus on the probability assessment of the terrorism 
risk of nuclear power plants. Future research may explore how citizens assess the size of actual 
costs and losses in the terrorism risk of nuclear energy, addressing the other component of the 
risk concept. Second, many studies of individual attitudes toward technologies study the 
relationship between expert or scientific knowledge and layperson judgments (see, e.g., Critchley 
& Turney, 2004; Kearns et al., 2006; Legge & Durant, 2010; Rothman & Lichter, 1987; Slovic, 
1987; Slovic, et al., 1980); while we only focus on the effect of hard knowledge, future research 
may explicitly distinguish and study the tension between expert knowledge and layperson 
judgments over nuclear energy. Third, many studies of individual attitudes toward new 
technologies have shown the conditional or unconditional effects of social trust (e.g., Critchley & 
Turney, 2004; Legge & Durant, 2010; Segrist, 2000). While we have not considered the issue of 
trust in this paper, it is certainly useful to study the role of social trust for the risk of nuclear 
technology. This is particularly relevant today, considering that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster exposed the systemic failure of Japanese corporations and governmental regulators to 
responsibly mange safety risks in the country’s nuclear power industry. Finally, surveys 
conducted following the Fukushima nuclear disaster survey may be useful in helping to ascertain 
the impact of that event on the public’s perception nuclear power’s safety risks and, potentially, 
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security risks. The new evidence will bring us closer to a better understanding of energy policy 
planning and homeland security.  
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Figure 1 Nuclear Power Plants and Risk of Terrorist Attack 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variables N mean sd min max 
Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy 861 0.4262 0.4948 0 1 
Support Nuclear Energy 919 0.6866 0.4641 0 1 
Support Nuclear Energy (instrument) 921 6.2215 2.6826 0 10 
Terrorism Concern 920 7.0207 2.5769 0 10 
T/N Knowledge 924 2.7316 1.0280 0 5 
Education 918 4.2691 1.4374 1 6 
Plant Proximity 923 0.2839 0.4511 0 1 
Evangelical 892 0.1222 0.3277 0 1 
Independent 872 0.4048 0.4911 0 1 
Democrat 872 0.3039 0.4602 0 1 
Ideology 880 4.5795 1.7554 1 7 
Age 897 55.9175 15.3027 19 93 
Male 924 0.4794 0.4998 0 1 
Income 696 6.7356 3.3071 1 11 
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Table 2 Determinants of Individual Assessments of Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Support Nuclear Energy -0.652 -0.609   -0.617 -0.612 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Support Nuclear Energy (instrument)   0.063 0.057   
   (0.002) (0.012)   
Terrorism Concern  0.059 0.060 0.036 0.042 0.065 0.059 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.066) (0.055) (0.004) (0.009) 
T/N Knowledge -0.109 -0.097 -0.105 -0.088 -0.109 -0.101 
 (0.027) (0.079) (0.031) (0.108) (0.049) (0.069) 
Education -0.103 -0.005 -0.110 -0.014 -0.057 -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.899) (0.002) (0.747) (0.193) (0.784) 
Plant Proximity -0.017 0.013 -0.039 -0.011 0.021 0.011 
 (0.875) (0.910) (0.712) (0.928) (0.860) (0.925) 
Evangelical -0.065 0.094 -0.013 0.134 0.157 0.093 
 (0.673) (0.599) (0.930) (0.443) (0.360) (0.599) 
Independent 0.155 0.100 0.120 0.089 0.124 0.103 
 (0.203) (0.467) (0.325) (0.514) (0.364) (0.453) 
Democrat 0.295 0.251 0.267 0.227 0.298 0.252 
 (0.047) (0.133) (0.068) (0.167) (0.072) (0.131) 
Ideology -0.026 -0.056 -0.031 -0.067 -0.057 -0.056 
 (0.454) (0.161) (0.379) (0.097) (0.152) (0.159) 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.002 
 (0.486) (0.683) (0.900) (0.986) (0.356) (0.597) 
Male -0.033 0.001 -0.106 -0.084 -0.049 -0.010 
 (0.737) (0.993) (0.266) (0.440) (0.668) (0.933) 
Income  -0.055  -0.055  -0.056 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.461 0.463 -0.016 0.027 0.226 0.549 
 (0.203) (0.291) (0.967) (0.953) (0.627) (0.250) 
Model Wald test (χ2) 69.01 62.84 46.72 48.03 52.05 63.06 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test of rho=0 (cross-equation)     0.01 0.18 
Prob> χ2     0.9049 0.6755 
Observations 765 615 766 616 821 821 
Robust p values in parentheses.  
Results for the selection equation in the Heckman models of Columns (5) and (6) not reported. 
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Appendix 1 Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 
Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Energy 
1.000              
2 
Support Nuclear Energy 
-0.250 1.000             
3 
Terrorism Concern 
0.054 0.159 1.000            
4 
T/N Knowledge 
-0.084 0.039 -0.032 1.000           
5 
Education 
-0.135 0.019 -0.140 0.165 1.000          
6 
Plant Proximity 
-0.017 0.051 -0.012 0.054 0.041 1.000         
7 
Evangelical 
-0.023 0.019 0.055 -0.011 0.023 0.008 1.000        
8 
Independent 
0.000 0.038 0.001 0.009 -0.069 0.046 -0.022 1.000       
9 
Democrat 
0.104 -0.202 -0.119 0.004 0.047 -0.027 -0.067 -0.545 1.000      
10 
Ideology 
-0.089 0.280 0.260 -0.027 -0.142 -0.005 0.183 0.040 -0.464 1.000     
11 
Age 
-0.003 0.067 0.144 -0.051 -0.092 -0.017 -0.128 -0.021 -0.002 0.117 1.000    
12 
Male 
-0.061 0.186 -0.105 0.141 0.058 0.080 0.028 0.134 -0.139 0.087 -0.120 1.000   
13 
Income 
-0.183 0.078 -0.098 0.133 0.390 0.059 -0.037 -0.009 -0.084 -0.012 -0.218 0.162 1.000  
14 
Support Nuclear Energy (instrument) 
0.154 -0.222 0.071 -0.041 0.014 0.032 -0.104 0.043 0.228 -0.378 0.039 -0.153 -0.090 1.000 
 
